Public debt management by William McChesney Martin
Public Debt Management
AT THE OUTSET, I should like to state
that the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System agrees that the debt man-
agement proposals transmitted to you by
the President are necessary and desirable
and we urge their favorable consideration.
There are only a few points that I would
like to make, but before turning to them,
I think it is important that you should un-
derstand that I come before you in con-
nection with these proposals not as spokes-
man for the Administration, but as Chair-
man of the Board of Governors.
We are living today in a country of un-
precedented wealth. It is wealthy, in part,
because of abundant natural resources; and,
in part, because of the energy and initiative
of our people. An even more important dis-
tinction between the United States and most
other countries is the size and quality of the
accumulated stock of capital goods in the
hands of producers and consumers. Due
to past saving, we enjoy the benefits which
flow from a reservoir of housing and durable
goods in the hands of consumers, of public
facilities, such as highways, school build-
ings, and waterways, and of industrial plant
and equipment. The society in which we
live has been popularly characterized as
affluent, and despite our proper concern for
certain depressed areas—both economic and
geographic—I am sure that we can all agree
with this characterization.
NOTE.—Statement of William McChesney Martin,
Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, before the Ways and Means Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives, June 11, 1959.
One consequence of affluence is expo-
sure to instability in the pace of general ac-
tivity and also in interest rates which rise
in periods of boom and decline in periods of
recession. In a very primitive economy,
where everyone must work as hard as he can
to eke out a bare living, additions to stock of
capital are largely made by diverting effort
directly to production of capital goods. Such
borrowing and lending as does take place is
effected at interest rates which we would
regard as fantastically high. In this type of
economy, there is little threat of instability
except from natural causes. A drought or
an unusually good season may produce rela-
tive poverty or plenty. But the range of eco-
nomic fluctuation will tend to be fairly
small.
The greater the accumulation of wealth
the greater are the possibilities for eco-
nomic fluctuation. These may stem from
shifts in the peoples' preferences among the
wide range of expenditure opportunities
open to them, from changing attitudes to-
ward saving and investment, from over-
speculation which undermines the solvency
of financial institutions, or, perhaps on some
occasions, simply from the arrival at a point
where even a high rate of technical inno-
vation fails to induce investment decisions
adequate to sustain capital expansion.
It is not surprising that, in a free and
wealthy economy, we are unable to counter-
balance perfectly, through changes in pub-
lic policy, the wide shifts that can take place.
We always have had, and, I think, always
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will have, changes in the pace of our eco-
nomic progress. We can and should work
to reduce these fluctuations and strive for
the goal of stable growth. At the same time,
however, we must recognize that it is highly
unlikely that we shall ever achieve perfec-
tion.
Fluctuations in our economy express
themselves in various ways, and we attempt
to gauge them by various statistical meas-
ures. If we look at the movements in any
of the broad measures of economic activity
and compare them with fluctuations in in-
terest rates, the conclusion is inescapable
that interest rates tend generally to move
upward in periods of prosperity and down-
ward in times of recession or arrested
growth. Hence, concerned as we may be
about the impact of rising interest rates on
the burden of the public debt or on neces-
sitous borrowers, we must recognize that
rising interest rates are, in fact, a symptom
of broad prosperity and rapid economic
growth.
Since the stabilization of monetary sys-
tems in key countries after World War II,
interest rates have been higher in most other
industrial countries than in the United States.
This has been a period of great economic
growth, very active demands for credit, fur-
ther monetary expansion, and continuing,
though perhaps abating, inflationary pres-
sures. This past year's rise in interest rate
levels here, accompanying economic recov-
ery, has been in contrast to some decline in
interest rate levels in Western European
countries, where a modest recession came
somewhat later than in the United States
and Canada.
In the United States, the rise in interest
rates has affected all types and maturities of
debt instruments. Yields on long-term se-
curities have generally risen by about 2 per-
centage points since the low point reached
shortly after the end of the war. Yields now
range from 4 to AV2 per cent on U. S. Gov-
ernment securities of long- and medium-
term, over AVi per cent on many outstand-
ing Aaa corporate bonds, and average over
5 per cent on outstanding Baa corporate
bonds. New issues necessarily have to be
offered to investors at higher rates.
Despite their recent upward movement,
interest rates in the United States are still
at levels comparable with those prevailing
during much of our history. Long-term
rate movements since last summer have been
within the range of the period from the
early part of this century through 1930.
The level is still substantially lower than
during most of the nineteenth century.
From an historical viewpoint, the present
level of rates can hardly be regarded as "out
of line" for a period of wide prosperity and
growth.
In comparing present rate levels with
those of past periods, one of the important
things sometimes overlooked is the effect
of our necessarily high tax structure on the
effective rate of interest. For example, if
both the borrower and lender are subject to
the 52 per cent tax on corporate profits, the
borrowers' net cost and the lenders' net
return is a little less than half of the ex-
pressed rate. Thus, a market rate of say, 4
per cent, implies for both parties a net rate
of a little less than 2 per cent. On its own
taxable bonds, the Federal Government,
through the income tax, recaptures a sub-
stantial share of the interest it pays. When
we look at interest rates in long-term per-
spective, we must bear in mind that net
yields after taxes are lower today than a
comparison of market rates would suggest,
because of the fact that taxes are higher.
Aggressive demands for financing, which.
Federal Reserve Bulletin: June 1959PUBLIC DEBT MANAGEMENT 583
as I have said, are characteristic of pros-
perous times, represent efforts to attract
resources away from current consumption in
return for the payment of interest. In a free
economy, no matter how affluent, it follows
that, when borrowers attempt to attract a
larger share of the total product for their
purposes, they will have to pay for doing it.
The presence of strong demands on the
credit markets from borrowers of all kinds
does create a difficult financial problem.
Recently credit demands have been press-
ing on the banking system, and the banks
have been accommodating a growing vol-
ume of loans. As borrowers have sought
accommodation, banks have raised their
prime rate from 4 to AVi per cent. This
is the interest rate that banks charge top-
quality customers on short-term loans.
More recently, the discount rate of the
Federal Reserve Banks has been raised
from 3 to 3Yi per cent. The discount rate
is the interest rate that is charged by a Fed-
eral Reserve Bank when a member bank
borrows money from it. This money is
often called high-powered money. It is
high-powered because it is credited directly
to the reserve account of a member bank,
and, unless used to finance a payment of
currency into public circulation or an out-
flow of gold or some other development
which drains the member bank reserve base,
it forms the basis for a multiple expansion
of bank credit and money.
For some months, we have been having
rapid expansion of bank credit and money,
based largely on borrowed reserve funds.
The seasonally adjusted money supply—
demand deposits at banks plus currency in
circulation—has increased by more than $2
billion in the last four months, an annual
rate of growth of about 5 per cent. In the
face of developing high-level prosperity and
the potential threat of inflationary boom, the
Federal Reserve should not be in the posi-
tion of encouraging an undue expansion
of bank credit and money. Hence, the ap-
propriate discount rate under present cir-
cumstances is one that does not encourage
member bank borrowing and is generally
above current rates on short-term market
obligations, such as bills.
It is sometimes asserted that the Federal
Reserve System should step in and halt the
upward trend of interest rates resulting from
active demands for loans by supplying suf-
ficient Federal Reserve credit in one form
or another to keep interest rates from rising.
This cannot be done without promoting in-
flation—indeed without converting the Fed-
eral Reserve System into an engine of in-
flation.
When such a program was adopted during
and following the war, it did succeed for a
time in actually pegging interest rates on
Government obligations. But, at the same
time it promoted and facilitated the danger-
ous bank credit and monetary expansion
that developed under the harness of direct
price, wage, and material controls. The
suppressed inflation that resulted, we are
now well aware, burst forth eventually in
a very rapid depreciation of the dollar and
even threatened to destroy our free econ-
omy.
This experience is very recent and the
effects are widely and well remembered. It
is now very doubtful whether the Federal
Reserve System could, in fact, peg interest
rates on Government obligations under to-
day's conditions even if we accepted the
inflationary costs, which would be high and
would eventually lead to severe collapse.
It is certain that the Federal Reserve could
not extend interest rate stability to all
markets.
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The trouble is that the world has learned
from wartime inflationary experience. It
now knows that inflation follows any effort
to keep interest rates low through money
creation as the night follows the day. Any
attempt on the part of the Federal Reserve
to peg rates today would be shortly followed
by an acceleration of the outflow of gold in
response to demands from abroad, by fur-
ther diversion of savings from investment in
bonds and other fixed interest obligations
into stocks and other equities, and by a
mounting of demands for borrowed funds in
order to speculate in equities and to beat
the higher prices and costs anticipated in
the future.
Those familiar with the investment mar-
kets will confirm to you that such develop-
ments would inevitably follow a Federal
Reserve attempt to peg interest rates. A
simply tremendous volume of bank reserves
would have to be thrown into the market
through Federal Reserve open market pur-
chases in the attempt to stem the upward
pressure on interest rates. As these reserves
enhanced inflationary pressures even fur-
ther, the rush from money and fixed obli-
gations into gold and physical property, as
well as the mounting demands for credit to
reap speculative profits and to hedge against
future inflation, would overwhelm even the
most heroic efforts to hold interest rates
down. Ultimately, if the gold reserve re-
quirements to which the Federal Reserve
is now subject were eliminated, the System
might acquire a large proportion of publicly
held Government debt of over $200 billion
in this way. True, the interest rate on Gov-
ernment obligations might be said in some
distorted sense to have been stabilized by
such an operation. Interest rates generally,
however, would spiral upward as they al-
ways have in every major inflation.
People who save will be unwilling to lend
their money at low interest rates even when
they expect the depreciation in the value of
their dollars to be limited. This is under-
standable. Take, for example, a corporate
financial institution subject to a 52 per cent
tax. The after-tax income from a bond
yielding 4V4 per cent interest would amount
to just a little over 2 per cent with the dollar
stable in value. If this potential investor
had reason to fear that the value of the dollar
would depreciate even 1 per cent a year, he
would anticipate a very low real return. If
the investor had reason to expect a price rise
of just over 2 per cent a year, he would fore-
see a negative real return. Investors are
alert today to this way of figuring interest
returns.
It might be added that to suggest hold-
ing interest rates down by supplying the
banking system with reserves through Fed-
eral Reserve open market purchases of Gov-
ernment securities, on the one hand, and
taking them away with higher reserve re-
quirement increases, on the other, repre-
sents a fundamental misunderstanding of
how the credit system functions. Obviously,
if the net effects on the credit base are, in
fact, offsetting, they make no net addition
to the total supply of bank credit, nor do
they reduce the demands of borrowers. If
they are not fully offsetting, the net result
is inflationary. We are all acutely aware
of the gigantic size of the publicly held debt
that is outstanding and available to provide
a basis for such monetary inflation. There
is no magic formula by which we can eat
our cake and have it too.
If the Federal Government should substi-
tute artificially created money for savings
in an effort to prevent interest rates from
rising, it would have a reverse effect. It
would worsen the very situation that the ac-
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tion was intended to relieve. If you really
want to encourage rising interest rates, you
have only to follow the prescription of those
who argue that interest rates on Government
or any other obligations can be pegged by
inflating the money supply.
In connection with this discussion, it
should be re-emphasized that the Federal
Reserve System does not "like" high rates
of interest. We are anxious, always, that
interest levels be as low as is consistent with
sustained high levels of economic activity,
with a steady rise in our national well-being,
and with reasonable stability for value for
the dollar. We cannot, moreover, put in-
terest rates where we would whatever our
"likes." Federal Reserve policies can, of
course, influence interest rates to some ex-
tent through their influence on the rate at
which the banking system can add to the
credit and money supply. The effectiveness
of Federal Reserve policies is always sub-
ject to the reaction of borrowers and savers
as expressed through the market.
In an economy in which people are alert
and sensitive to price changes, the only way
to bring about a lower level of interest rates
is to increase the flow of real savings or to
decrease the amount of borrowing. One
important way to do this is to reduce sub-
stantially the deficit at which the Govern-
ment is operating. This will not only relieve
immediately some of the demand pressures
that are pushing interest rates up in credit
markets, it will also reassure savers as to the
future value of the money they put in bonds
and savings institutions and thus increase
the flow of savings into interest bearing
obligations.
The proposals before you do not relate to
the levels of rates that will prevail in the
market, but rather to whether or not the
Government will be able to use savings
bonds and marketable bonds effectively as
parts of its program of debt management.
The forthright management of the public
debt is an essential part of any program to
encourage saving and lower interest rates.
We should not force the Treasury to resort
to undesirable expedients in order to com-
ply with arbitrary ceilings on either the size
of the debt or the rate of interest it pays.
International levels of interest rates
among industrial countries are now more
closely aligned than in earlier postwar years.
This realignment, together with removal of
most restrictions on the movement of capi-
tal, reflects progress towards a closer rela-
tionship among international money mar-
kets, which is the financial counterpart of
progress toward sustained growth in output
and trade in the free world generally. It
also signifies a state of affairs in which capi-
tal demands are becoming international in
scope and in which they will converge rap-
idly on the market that is cheapest and most
readily prepared to accommodate them.
Under these circumstances, interest rates in
this country must increasingly reflect world-
wide as well as domestic conditions.
We need to remember that today the
dollar is the anchor of international financial
stability. That anchor must be solid. Re-
alistic financial policies of Government are
essential to that end as well as to the end
of a wealthy and strong domestic economy.
At this juncture of world development, the
least evidence of an irresponsible attitude
on the part of the United States toward its
financial obligations or of its unwillingness
to face squarely the issues that confront it
in meeting greater demand pressures on re-
sources and prices, would have very serious
repercussions throughout the free world.
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